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Abstract Reinhart (1983) claims that only pronouns whose antecedents c-command
them may give rise to sloppy identity readings. This paper presents counterexam-
ples to this claim; for instance, referring to the famous 1960 televised presidential
debate, it is acceptable to say: Kennedy looked good. People voted for him. Nixon
looked bad. People didn’t. Despite the fact that the antecedent Kennedy for the
pronoun him is in a previous sentence, this pronoun allows a sloppy identity read-
ing wherein the fourth sentence (People didn’t) means that people didn’t vote for
Nixon. To analyze such cases, I first propose an extension to the ∼ focus operator
due to Rooth (1992), allowing this operator to alter the assignment function used
to interpret pronouns. One construction where Rooth places ∼ is in the answers
to questions. My new meaning for ∼ explains why pronouns are so constrained in
answers, e.g., Who does John like? He[=John] likes Mary. Next, I argue for the
Question-Under-Discussion (QUD) model of discourse described in Roberts 2012,
which theorizes that every sentence is the answer to an explicit or implicit ques-
tion. Finally, I show that unbound sloppy identity examples can be analyzed as
cases where pronouns are constrained by antecedents in implicit questions. Along
the way, I argue that the QUD model is compatible with the coherence relation
model of discourse due to Hobbs (1979), explaining how coherence can constrain
pronoun reference as well.
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1 Sloppy identity
The puzzle presented in this paper involves so-called sloppy identity readings. This
section introduces the concept of strict and sloppy identity and argues against the
common assumption that sloppy readings only arise when a pronoun has a c-com-
manding antecedent.
1.1 Strict and sloppy readings
Since at least Reinhart 1983, differing readings under VP ellipsis have been used
as a diagnosis for bound pronouns. For instance, consider (1), which has the two
readings shown in (2):
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(1) Sherlock saw his hat. Watson did, too.
(2) a. . . . Watson saw Sherlock’s hat. [strict identity]
b. . . . Watson saw his own hat. [sloppy identity]
In the reading illustrated in (2a), the owner of the hat is maintained as Sherlock in
the second clause; this is called the strict identity reading. In the reading illustrated
in (2b), however, the hat’s owner shifts to Watson instead of Sherlock; this is called
the sloppy identity reading (Ross 1967).
One way to analyze these two readings is to posit that there are actually two
different structures in the first clause of (1), and whichever of the two appears is
copied into the ellipsis site (Keenan 1971; Sag 1976):1
(3) a. Sherlock [VP saw hisi hat]. Watson did [VP saw hisi hat], too.
b. Sherlock λi [VP saw hisi hat]. Watson did λi [VP saw hisi hat], too.
The structure in (3a) shows a free occurrence of the pronoun his, which is inter-
preted via the contextually-derived, global assignment function used to interpret
the entire sentence. If this global assignment returns Sherlock for index i, then his
will denote Sherlock both in the pronounced version and inside the ellipsis. The
structure in (3b), on the other hand, shows an occurrence of his that is bound by
a c-commanding λ operator. The λ operator combines with the VP to denote a
λ function. This operator also creates a local assignment function (used only to
evaluate the VP) wherein the relevant index (i in this case) returns a variable whose
value corresponds to the argument passed to the λ function. In (3b), therefore,
no matter what the global assignment function returns for index i, the pronounced
pronoun hisi will always denote Sherlock, the argument passed to the λ function.
However, since the argument to the λ function in the ellipsis site is now Watson
instead of Sherlock, the local assignment function used to evaluate the elided VP
will return Watson for index i; and therefore the second clause of (3b) will denote
the proposition that Watson saw his own hat.
Under this view, then, sloppy identity readings can be thought of as tools to
diagnose which pronouns can receive their meanings via a local assignment. Such
an assignment is possible in the first clause of (1), and therefore a sloppy identity
reading is available in the second clause.
1 For high-level summaries of such theories of ellipsis, see Heim & Kratzer 1998, Section 9.3 on p.
248, Büring 2005, Section 5.5 on p. 114, and Merchant 2013.
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1.2 Sloppy identity unbound
There are cases of sloppy identity, though, that do not seem to involve c-command.
Take (4) for instance:
(4) Sherlock’s INTELLECT exceeds hisi PATIENCE.
Because the pronoun his is not syntactically bound in (4)2, there is no local as-
signment function involving the index i. Remember, though, that it was the local
assignment function in (1) that allowed for a sloppy identity reading. Here, without
a local assignment, the only possible way to interpret the pronoun his is via the
global assignment. Indeed, this is why Reinhart (1983) claimed that sloppy identity
requires a pronoun with a c-commanding antecedent.
And yet, consider the pair of sentences in (5), involving VP ellipsis. Current
theories predict the sloppy identity reading to be lacking here, because the only
structure available to copy into the ellipsis site is the one where his refers globally
to Sherlock, as shown in (5):
(5) Sherlock’s intellect exceeds hisi patience.
Watson’s intellect does not exceed hisi patience.
Under this structure, the second, unspoken his is interpreted as the item indexed
i in the global assignment – in other words, Sherlock. This is indeed a reading
of the second sentence, but it is not necessarily the most salient reading. Another
quite salient reading is the unpredicted sloppy one, where the second his refers to
Watson. Similarly, (6) has a strict and sloppy reading, and again the sloppy reading
is at least as salient:
(6) Only Sherlock’s intellect exceeds his patience (not Watson’s intellect).
a. . . . Watson’s intellect does not exceed Sherlock’s patience. [strict]
b. . . . Watson’s intellect does not exceed his own patience. [sloppy]
Additionally, quite natural sloppy identity cases exist where the antecedent is
in a separate sentence from the pronoun – a configuration most theories claim to
preclude syntactic binding. For instance, in reference to the famous televised debate
of 1960, one could say the following:
(7) Kennedy looked good. People voted for him.
Nixon looked bad. People didn’t.
2 Its only potential syntactic binder, Sherlock, does not c-command the pronoun.
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The most salient reading for the last sentence in (7) is that people didn’t vote for
Nixon – a sloppy reading. Thus, it seems that sloppy readings are possible even in
the absence of syntactic binding.
2 Previous analyses
The case in (7) is a counterexample to most other theories of unusual sloppy iden-
tity, but it will still be instructive to examine a few previous theories related to the
phenomena presented so far.
2.1 Unusual syntactic binding
The contrarian reader might have wondered above whether a possessor such as
Sherlock in Sherlock’s intellect might indeed syntactically bind a later pronoun. In
fact, several researchers have proposed irregular binding techniques to account for
cases like the following:
(8) Every boy’s father thinks he’s a genius. (Higginbotham 1980: 691)
(9) Somebody from every city despises it. (May 1985: 68)
In (8) and (9), a universal quantifier (every boy or every city) co-varies with a later
pronoun, seemingly without c-commanding this pronoun. This goes against the-
ories requiring c-command for such co-variation. To capture the binding in (8),
Higginbotham (1980) therefore proposes that quantifier raising (QR) can raise pos-
sessors to c-command later pronouns, and other researchers have proposed several
other methods as well (see Reinhart 1987; Kayne 1994). Similarly, various analy-
ses have been proposed to account for so-called inverse linking contexts like (9),
where a universal quantifier inside an existential DP appears to scope above this
existential (see May & Bale 2005).
However, there are plenty of cases of pronouns allowing sloppy identity whose
antecedents are not in positions where quantifiers may bind a later pronoun. For
instance, consider the two pairs of sentences below: (10a) and (11a) show sentences
which are ungrammatical because a quantifier fails to bind a later pronoun; and
(10b) and (11b) show pronouns whose antecedent is in the same position as the
quantifier in the previous sentence and yet still allow sloppy readings:
(10) a. *At least one woman with every lipstick color appeared on the news
wearing it. (after May & Bale 2005: 641)
b. At least one woman with Electric Orange lipstick appeared on the
news wearing it. At least one woman with Vivid Rose lipstick did,
too. [sloppy preferred]
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(11) a. *A boy that annoyed every mother asked her for another cookie. (after
May & Bale 2005: 641)
b. A boy that annoyed Mary asked her for another cookie. A boy that
annoyed Sally did, too. [strict, sloppy]
I will therefore assume that unbound pronouns allowing sloppy identity readings are
neither derived via QR nor any extraordinary scoping method proposed to capture
cases like (8) or inverse linking cases like (9).
2.2 E-type analyses
Example (12) is an additional case where a pronoun (him) allows a sloppy interpre-
tation despite having an antecedent (John) in a syntactic island and hence unable
to c-command the pronoun (Wescoat 1989; Dalrymple, Shieber & Pereira 1991;
Fiengo & May 1994; Hardt 1993).3 Tomioka (1999) attempts to explain this appar-
ent counterexample to Reinhart’s (1983) c-command restriction on sloppy readings
by suggesting that the pronoun him is an E-type pronoun (Evans 1980), whose
meaning approximates the definite description in (13). Thus, the pronoun is not
bound to John, but rather contains a pronoun bound to the relative pronoun below
officer:
(12) The police officer who arrested Johni insulted himi, and the one who ar-
rested Bill j did insult him{i, j}, too. [strict, sloppy]
(13) The police officer whoi arrested John insulted the man hei arrested, and
the one who j arrested Bill did insult the man he{i, j} arrested, too. [strict,
sloppy]
Although this approach works well for (12), it is unclear how Tomioka’s system
would handle cases like (14), where the two relative clauses use different verbs.
Furthermore, several authors have pointed out an erroneous prediction of this anal-
ysis (Elbourne 2001, 2005; Hardt 2003): the sentence in (15a), which features an
explicit definite description, allows both a strict interpretation – where Officer Jones
and the arresting officer insult the same man – and a sloppy one – where the two
officers each insulted the (possibly different) men they arrested. However, the sen-
tence in (15b), which features a pronoun, lacks the sloppy reading, casting doubt on
whether the pronoun actually has a meaning approximating the definite description.
(14) The officer who arrested John insulted him, and the one who booked Bill
did, too.
3 See also Lappin 1984 and Evans 1988, cited in Hardt 2003.
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(15) a. The police officer whoi arrested John insulted the man hei arrested,
and Officer Jones j did, too. [strict, sloppy]
b. The police officer whoi arrested John insulted him, and Officer Jones j
did, too. [strict, *sloppy]
Elbourne (2008) instead analyzes (12) using the phenomenon of NP ellipsis with
split antecedents shown in (16). NP ellipsis is similar to VP ellipsis, except that the
material that is elided (i.e., unpronounced) is an NP instead of a VP. As Elbourne
points out, though, the simple structure in (16a) is not quite right for split antecedent
cases, since it could mean that Mary borrowed Bill’s screwdriver instead of his
hammer. Thus, he proposes a richer structure, akin to that shown in (16b). This
suggests the meaning shown in (17) for (12):
(16) Mary needed a hammer. Jill needed a screwdriver. Each borrowed Bill’s.
a. . . . Each borrowed Bill’s hammer or screwdriver.
b. . . . Eachi borrowed Bill’s unique item out of {hammer, screwdriver}
that shei needed.
(17) The police officer whoi arrested John insulted him [≈ the member of {John,Bill}
who hei arrested], and the one who j arrested Bill did insult the member of
{John,Bill} who he{i, j} arrested, too.
This analysis avoids the problem in (14), but a number of issues remain. First, it
suffers from the same problem Elbourne (2001, 2005) pointed out via (15). Imagine
that a different officer arrested John and Officer Jones arrested Bill. Thus, the rela-
tion “the member of {John,Bill} who x arrested” is salient, but even so, (15b) can
only mean that Officer Jones insulted John (the strict reading) not Bill (the sloppy
reading).
Also, there are cases of sloppy identity where analogous structures do not allow
NP ellipsis. For instance, (18a) shows a case of VP ellipsis where sloppy identity
shifts the referent of a pronoun from Obama to Romney, but the same configuration
in (18b) does not allow NP ellipsis at all (cf. I love Democrats and have dated
several). Similarly, (19a) is a case of where a deaccented pronoun can received
a sloppy identity reading but the same configuration in (19b) does not allow NP
ellipsis. (Deaccenting is indicated using a smaller font.) Interestingly, (19a) is
a case where an E-type or Elbourne (2008) analysis would predict an i-within-i
violation akin to that shown in (19c), but none is found.
(18) a. Articles that portrayed himi as conservative never bothered Obamai as
much as articles that DIDN’T portray him{i, j} as conservative both-
ered Romney j. [strict, sloppy]
b. *Articles that portray one/at least two/several/most/Clinton’s as conser-
417
Keshet
vative never bothered Democrats (. . . as much as articles that DIDN’T
bothered Republicans).
(19) a. Rumors about him never bothered Biden as much as FACTS about him
bothered Ryan.
b. *Rumors about mine never bothered your mom (. . . as much as FACTS
about mine bothered your dad).
c. *[Rumors about the man theyi bothered]i . . .
Therefore, E-type and related analyses of such unusual sloppy identity are not em-
pirically adequate.
3 Analysis
This section presents my alternative analysis of unbound sloppy identity. First, I
argue that the ∼ focus operator due to Rooth (1992) may alter pronoun interpreta-
tions. Since this operator is in effect in question-answer pairs, it explains the tight
connection between pronouns in answers and their antecedents in questions. Next, I
argue for the model of discourse where every sentence – in fact, even sub-sentential
clauses – is interpreted as the answer to a question, usually an unspoken implicit
question. This model is used to explain the unbound sloppy identity cases, because
the pronouns in such cases get their meanings from antecedents in the implicit ques-
tions which they are interpreted as answering.
3.1 Focus
We have already seen, in (5) above, that contrasting clauses can constrain pronoun
meanings and give rise to sloppy identity readings. Another example of this phe-
nomenon is shown in (20a), where NP1 and NP2 contrast, constraining the pronoun
he to refer to John. This does allow a sloppy reading in a subsequent sentence, as
shown in (20b):
(20) a. The [NP1 car Johni BOUGHT] was nicer than the [NP2 car hei SOLD].
b. The car BILL j bought WASN’T nicer than the car he{i, j} sold.
The first ingredient of my analysis, then, will be a slightly new theory of focus,
which can explain how this pronoun gets its meaning.
I will adopt the view that certain nodes in syntax – those intuitively thought of
as “focused” – are marked with an F feature. Non-F-marked nodes are said to be
GIVEN. Next, following Rooth (1985, 1992), I will assume each LF node α has
two semantic values. Its ordinary semantic value, written JαKo or simply JαK, is
calculated normally (e.g., as described in Heim & Kratzer 1998). Its focus semantic
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value, written JαK f , is a set containing alternatives identical to α modulo any F-
marked items. I will refer to the members of this set as α’s focus alternatives.
The focus semantic value of a node α under an assignment g can be defined
using a recursive procedure like (21) (cf. Hamblin 1973; von Stechow 1974; Keenan
& Faltz 1978; Gazdar 1980; Keenan & Faltz 1985; Rooth 1985):
(21) a. F-marked nodes:
If α is F-marked, JαK f ,g = {φ | φ is a contextually salient denotation
of the same type as JαKg}.
b. Simplex GIVEN nodes:
If α is not F-marked and has no children, JαK f ,g = {JαKg}.
c. Complex GIVEN nodes:
If α is a non-F-marked node with children β and γ , JαK f ,g is the
pointwise combination of Jβ K f ,g and JγK f ,g – i.e., the set containing,
for each b ∈ Jβ K f ,g, g ∈ JγK f ,g, the result of applying the standard
Heim & Kratzer rule for combining b and g.
To illustrate how this procedure works, consider the following small structure:
(22) [VP [V plays ] [DPF the violin] ]
The verb plays in (22) is GIVEN and simplex, and therefore its focus semantic value
is the singleton set containing its ordinary semantic value: {JplaysK}. The DP the
violin, on the other hand, is F-marked, and therefore it represents the set of salient
similar denotations of the same type (type 〈e〉), e.g. {Jthe violinK, Jthe celloK,
Jthe sackbuttK, Jthe sousaphoneK, . . . }. The VP in (22) is GIVEN and complex,
and therefore its focus semantic value is the pointwise combination of its chil-
dren’s focus semantic values. Since the verb play is a function over individuals
and Jthe violinK f is a set of individuals, this pointwise combination is the result of
applying the verb to each individual in Jthe violinK f , perhaps as shown in (23):
(23)


Jplays the violinK, Jplays the celloK,
Jplays the sackbuttK, Jplays the sousaphoneK,
. . .


Rooth (1992) proposes an operator, ∼, that makes use of focus semantic values
to enforce connections between items in discourse. For instance, in (20), NP1 and
NP2 contrast with one another, requiring a certain focus structure to do so. The
∼ operator enforces this contrast via a discourse variable, labeled P7 in (24). The
operator ∼ presupposes that P7 is a subset of the focus semantic value of the LF
node ∼ combines with. Since both NP1 and NP2 are complements of ∼, they must
match one another rather closely.
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In Keshet 2011, I updated the definition of this operator to allow it to alter the
local assignment function. To see how this works, first notice that the sentence
in (20) allows a sloppy reading for the pronoun he. My change to ∼ allows it to
alter the assignment function on its sister clause, as shown in the definition in (25).
This creates local pronoun meanings, which can then receive sloppy interpretations
under VP ellipsis.
(24) S
VP
DP
NP
∼ P7NP2
car he3 soldF
D
the
V
was nicer than
DP
NP
∼ P7NP1
car John boughtF
D
the
(25) a. Jα ∼ PKo,h presupposes that there is a minimal variant g of the assign-
ment function h, such that
(i) P is a subset of JαK f ,g and
(ii) JαKo,g is an element of P.
b. If such a g exists, Jα ∼ PKo,h denotes JαKo,g.
In particular, the definition in (25) presupposes that we can find an assignment g
that makes JNP2Kg a superset of P7. But we already know that JNP1Kg is a superset
of P7, and therefore P7 only contains items following the pattern in (26):
(26) { car John bought, car John sold, car John painted, car John drove, . . . }
In order for JNP2Kg to also be a superset of (26), g(2) must return John, setting the
correct interpretation for this pronoun.
Most cases of unbound sloppy identity readings do not involve contrasting
phrases, though, so we will need to extend this theory a bit to handle the majority
of the cases shown above. Rooth (1992) uses his focus theory to analyze question-
answer pairs, such as (27). Notice that the pronoun he is strictly constrained in this
case to refer to John – otherwise the response would not answer the question. Fol-
lowing Hamblin (1973), Rooth assumes that a question denotes a set of propositions
that answer the question. These answers are derived by replacing wh-phrases in the
question with specific matching material. For instance, the question Who does John
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like? might denote the set of answers in (28):
(27) Q: Who does John like? A: He likes Mary.
(28) { John likes Bill, John likes Mary, John likes Sue, . . . }
Rooth then proposes that his ∼ operator enforces congruence between questions
and answers, as shown in (29):
(29) S1
Who does John like?
S2
S3
He4 likes Mary
∼ P1
Here, the variable P1 is linked to the question meaning in S1 – i.e., the set in (28).
∼ P1 ensures that the focus semantic value of S3, its complement, is a superset of
P1. In my new definition of ∼, this constraint is allowed to be enforced under an
altered assignment g; for instance, a g where g(4) returns John. This assignment
satisfies the constraints set by ∼ P1 and sets the correct meaning for the pronoun he.
Question-answer pairs often form the basis for theories of discourse structure.
Under such a theory, focus would constrain pronouns throughout the discourse.
This is therefore the model of discourse I turn to in Section 3.2.
3.2 Question-structured discourse
The second ingredient of my analysis requires a particular view of discourse the-
ory. The Question under Discourse model due to Roberts (2012) holds that all
sentences in discourse are best understood as answers to (often unspoken) ques-
tions.4 In particular, Roberts proposes that every utterance or move (Carlson 1982)
in a discourse is made in reference to a question under discussion or QUD. An
interrogative move (i.e., a question) is valid iff it poses a subquestion to the current
QUD. Such subquestions are pushed on top of the previous QUD, forming a stack
of questions, the topmost being the current QUD. A declarative move (i.e., an as-
sertion) is valid iff it answers the current QUD. If this answer is complete for the
purposes of the discourse, the QUD is popped (removed) from the stack, revealing
the question beneath again as the current QUD.
Discourses following this model sound more natural than those that violate it.
For instance, the discourse in (30) is more felicitous than the one in (31) (QUD
pushes and pops are marked via indentation):
4 See also von Fintel 1994, who traces this idea back to Collingwood (1940) and, ultimately, Aristotle.
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(30) Who ate what?
a. What did John eat?
(i) John ate cake.
(ii) John ate pie.
b. What did Jill eat?
. . .
(31) Who ate what?
a. Who does John hate?
(i) I like Fred.
(ii) Lucius smiled.
b. Where did Jill sing?
. . .
Many discourses proceed sentence after sentence without a single question be-
ing uttered. Therefore, Roberts proposes that not all QUDs are explicitly spoken out
loud; often, a QUD will be inferred or accommodated in order to make a discourse
move valid (see also Carlson 1982). In particular, Roberts argues that “prosodic fo-
cus in English presupposes the type of question under discussion, a presupposition
which enables the hearer, with some other contextually given clues, to reconstruct
that question” (p. 8). Thus, the way a sentence is pronounced constrains the focus
structure of that sentence, which in turn constrains the QUD it could be answering.
If a compatible QUD has not actually been spoken out loud, one (or even a whole
series of QUDs) can be accommodated.
Beyond explaining why discourses may contain so few questions, the idea of
implicit QUDs, constrained by focus structure, helps Roberts analyze examples like
the following (cf. also Lakoff 1971; Rooth 1992):
(32) a. Mary called Sue a Republican.
b. Then SHEF insulted HERF.
(32a) alone does not imply anything in particular about calling someone a Repub-
lican. However, when followed by (32b), with the F-marking shown, suddenly the
meaning is conveyed that calling someone a Republican is an insult. Roberts argues
that these two sentences are understood as both answering the same QUD (Roberts
2012: 52).5 Due to fact that the verb insulted in (32b) is not F-marked, and hence
must be GIVEN, the QUD accommodated must be Who insulted whom? as shown
in (33), where 〈angle brackets〉 indicate an implicit question. But in order for (32a)
to be a valid answer to this question, calling someone a Republican must entail
insulting them.
5 Roberts only explicitly claims that these two clauses answer the same question when conjoined, but
her analysis extends to non-conjoined cases. For instance, two different responses to an explicit
question are often not conjoined with an overt word such as and or but:
(i) Where did everyone go?
a. John went to the store.
b. Mary went to the library.
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(33) 〈Who insulted whom?〉
a. Mary called Sue a Republican.
b. Then SHEF insulted HERF.
3.3 Embedded QUDs
In the QUD model as presented above, every full sentence must be the answer to a
QUD (explicit or implicit). Roberts (2012), among others, also analyzes conjoined,
subsentential clauses as answering QUDs. This raises the issue of whether other
subsentential clauses also might answer QUDs independently of the matrix sentence
that contains them. For instance, the multi-sentence discourse in (33) has a very
similar one-sentence analog:
(34) The man who MaryF [called a Republican]F insulted herF (too).
If we want to carry over our QUD analysis to these embedded cases, we must allow
subsentential clauses to be interpreted relative to (implicit) QUDs, even when their
matrix clauses answer a different QUD. In order to maintain the strict hierarchy of
the QUD structure, an embedded clause must answer a subquestion of its matrix
clause’s QUD. For instance, consider the structure in (36) for the sentence in (35):
(35) The guests who ate the salad were happier than those who ate the soup.
(36) 〈Did the soup or the salad satisfy the guests who ate it more?〉
The guests . . .
a. 〈Which guests ate which starter?〉
who t ate the salad . . .
were happier than those . . .
b. 〈Which guests ate which starter?〉
who t ate the soup.
The embedded QUDs in (36a) and (36b) count as subquestions to the top-level QUD
because a complete answer to the top-level QUD would entail a (complete) answer
to the embedded QUDs. A similar structure can explain the case in (34) (note for
(37) that every question is a subquestion of itself, so an embedded phrase is allowed
when it answers the same question as its matrix sentence):
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(37) 〈Who insulted whom?〉 The man . . .
a. 〈Who insulted whom?〉
who Mary called t a Republican . . .
insulted her, too.
In both cases above, subclauses of a larger sentence answer subquestions of this
matrix clause’s QUD.
3.4 Coherence relations
Coherence theory is another view of discourse, arguing that relationships between
clauses are necessary for felicitous juxtapositions in discourse. For instance, in a
discourse that begins with the sentence in (38a), (38c) is a much more natural next
sentence than (38b):
(38) a. John likes Bill.
b. Cabbage is a vegetable.
c. He gave him an extravagant gift.
Furthermore, a natural-sounding discourse conveys a meaning beyond the simple
sum of the meanings of its component clauses. Thus, the discourse comprising
(38a) and (38c) does not simply mean that these two statements are true but unre-
lated. Rather, it implies a relationship between the two sentences. In this case, there
are at least two possible such relationships, paraphrased in (39). In other words,
the discourse is ambiguous and this ambiguity stems not from either sentence, but
rather from how to understand the connection between the two sentences:
(39) a. John likes Bill because he gave him an extravagant gift.
b. John likes Bill and therefore he gave him an extravagant gift.
Just like focus structure, the resolution of this ambiguity one way or the other
has a substantial effect on how the pronouns in (38c) are understood. When the
discourse is understood as in (39a), where the second sentence explains or provides
evidence for the first, the subject pronoun he is best understood as referring to Bill,
while the object pronoun him is best understood as referring to John. When the
discourse is understood as in (39b), though, where the second sentence is the result
of the first, the most natural referents for the pronouns are switched: he refers to
John and him to Bill. And on top of all of this, such pronouns support later sloppy
identity, as shown in (40) and (41), suggesting that the meanings of these pronouns
are set via a local assignment:
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(40) John likes Bill. He gave him an extravagant gift.
a. Fred likes John for the same reason (i.e., because John gave Fred an
extravagant gift).
b. Fred likes John, and therefore did the same (i.e., gave John an extrav-
agant gift).
Hobbs (1979) builds a theory of pronoun reference on this observation: the
establishment of pronoun reference is a byproduct of the establishment of a coher-
ent discourse. Hobbs and others (Hobbs 1990; Kehler 2002; Asher & Lascarides
2003) have argued for a short list of relations between clauses in a discourse, which
Hobbs terms coherence relations. For instance, the relation holding in (39a) is an
EXPLANATION relation and the one in (39b) is a RESULT relation.6
So, now we have seen two proposals for how discourse constrains pronoun
meaning: one uses focus structure along with the QUD model of discourse, and
the other uses coherence relations. And yet, the two proposals are tantalizingly
similar in some respects. For instance, the PARALLEL and CONTRAST coherence
relations (shown in (41)) seem to simply be cases where two adjacent sentences
answer the same QUD:
(41) 〈Who likes Bill?〉
a. PARALLEL: John likes Bill. Fred likes him, too.
b. CONTRAST: John likes Bill. Fred doesn’t like him.
Such indications lead Kehler (2005, 2009) to suggest that the two models might
be compatible with one another. In addition, Kehler points out that differences in
pronunciation previously analyzed via coherence structure could perhaps be ana-
lyzed using QUD structure instead. Take (42) and (43) (Kehler’s (22) and (23)),
for example, where the same pair of clauses appears in a RESULT and a PARALLEL
relation:
(42) RESULT
a. PowellF defiedF CheneyF, and . . .
b. 〈What happened as a result?〉
(i) . . . BushF punishedF him.
6 I will discuss a few such coherence relations here, but the reader is referred to Kehler 2002 for a
more detailed discussion.
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(43) PARALLEL
a. 〈Who did what to Cheney?〉
(i) PowellF defiedF Cheney, and . . .
(ii) . . . BushF punishedF him.
The crucial difference in pronunciation is whether Cheney is accented. In the
PARALLEL case, Cheney is accommodated as part of the single implicit QUD both
clauses answer; therefore neither Cheney nor him is F-marked/accented. In the RE-
SULT case, on the other hand, the first clause is presumably answering a QUD that
does not mention Cheney, and therefore this name must be F-marked/accented as
new material. Although my proposal to combine the coherence and QUD mod-
els differs from that sketched in Kehler 2009, I view mine as a descendant of his
analysis.
To continue the work of connecting coherence relations and QUDs, remember
that the only valid moves in Roberts’ system are (a) answering the QUD or (b)
pushing a subquestion to the QUD on the QUD stack. So, even if adjacent sentences
don’t immediately answer the same QUD, they must answer subquestions of the
same (ancestor) QUD. I propose that coherence theory dictates which patterns of
subquestions to the same QUD (what Roberts terms strategies of inquiry) are most
natural, incorporating world knowledge as necessary.
To make this idea concrete, consider the following patterns of QUDs and sub-
questions, representing different coherence relations as marked:7
(44) QUD: 〈Tell me about John’s feelings towards Bill.〉
a. EXPLANATION:
(i) 〈Does John like Bill?〉
John likes Bill.
(ii) 〈Why does John like Bill?〉
a. 〈Did Bill give John something nice?〉
He gave him an extravagant gift.
b. RESULT:
(i) 〈Does John like Bill?〉
John likes Bill.
(ii) 〈What resulted from these feelings?〉
a. 〈Did John give Bill something nice?〉
Therefore, he gave him an extravagant gift.
7 The astute reader will notice that Tell me about John’s feelings towards Bill is not technically a
question. However, it acts semantically quite like a question, with felicitous and infelicitous answers:
(ii) Q: Tell me about John’s feelings towards Bill. A. John likes Bill. A′. #? The banana is ripe.
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The examples above represent two valid series of implicit questions and subques-
tions. The following, based on (38) above, is not a natural-sounding QUD structure,
although it does conform to Roberts’ basic rules:
(45) 〈What is the way things are?〉
a. 〈Does John like Bill?〉
John likes Bill.
b. 〈#What kind of food is cabbage?〉
Cabbage is a vegetable.
It is the purview of coherence theory (and beyond the scope of this paper) to explain
why some strategies of inquiry are natural and others are not. But once we take this
view, we derive the pronoun reference facts noticed by Hobbs (1979) “for free”
since they reduce to the question-answer cases above. For instance, the QUD in
(44aii) guarantees that he refers to Bill and him to John, while this pattern is reversed
in (44bii).
3.5 Coherence and sloppy identity
We now have all the pieces in place to fully explain all the examples of unbound
sloppy identity presented above. First, consider the case in (7), repeated here with
potential implicit QUDs:
(46) 〈How did the debate go for Kennedy?〉
a. 〈How did Kennedy look?〉
Kennedy looked good.
b. 〈What was the result of Kennedy looking good?〉
(i) 〈Did people vote for Kennedy (as a result)?〉
People voted for him.
According to coherence theory, the second in a pair of sentences often describes the
result of the first sentence. Hence, a natural second subquestion to the QUD in (46)
would be one asking about the result of the first subquestion. Then, due to the form
of the sentence People voted for him, its most natural immediate QUD will look like
one of the following: Did people vote for Kennedy?, Did people vote for Nixon?,
Did people vote for Obama?, etc. However, the only one of these that is a good
subquestion of What was the result of Kennedy looking good at the debate? – due
solely to world knowledge – is Did people vote for Kennedy?. Therefore, this is the
correct implicit QUD, and the pronoun him here is constrained to refer to Kennedy.
Similar analyses hold for the following examples (originally numbered (10b),
(12), (18a), and (19a) above):
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(47) 〈Which lipstick got good publicity last week?〉
a. 〈How many women with [each lipstick]i wore iti on the news?〉
(i) 〈How many women with Electric Orange lipstick appeared on
the news wearing Electric Orange lipstick?〉
At least one woman with Electric Orange lipstick appeared on
the news wearing it.
(ii) 〈How many women with Vivid Rose . . .〉
(48) 〈How did the police treat the protestors?〉
a. 〈How did the officer who arrested [each protestor]i treat himi?〉
(i) 〈How did the officer who arrested John treat John?〉
The officer who arrested John insulted him.
(ii) 〈How did the office who arrested Fred . . .〉
(49) 〈How did [each presidential candidate]i react to articles about himi?〉
a. 〈How did [each presidential candidate]i react to articles that portrayed
himi as conservative?〉
(i) 〈How did Obama react . . . that portrayed Obama as conservative?〉
Articles that portrayed him as conservative never bothered Obama.
(ii) 〈How did Romney react . . .〉
(50) 〈How did [each VP candidate]i react to stories about himi?〉
a. 〈How did Biden react to rumors about Biden?〉
Rumors about him never bothered Biden.
b. 〈How did Ryan react to facts . . .〉
At first glance, (49) and (50) seemed like cataphora, where the “antecedent” for the
pronouns appeared after the pronouns. Under the QUD structure presented here,
though, the actual antecedents to these pronouns come before them – they are found
in the implict QUDs which the relevant sentences answer. These implicit QUDs are
in turn constrained by appearance of the explicit names Obama and Biden; this
is the indirect method by which the names come to co-refer with the previously
spoken pronouns.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposed a change to Rooth’s ∼ operator to allow this operator to locally
alter the assignment function for the interpretation of pronouns. This small change,
taken with an appropriate model of discourse, explains the odd cases of sloppy
identity arising from pronouns whose antecedents do not c-command them.
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